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Re: [tor-talk] OnionBalance Hidden Service has over 1 million successful hits in just 3 days



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s7r requested I post the second round of log breakdowns, here it is:

HTTP Code: 200 (OK)
Bandwidth used (bytes): 1,457,612,885,805
Hits: 10,116,575

HTTP Code: 206 (Partial Content RFC 7233)
Bandwidth used (bytes): 5,751,202
Hits: 73

HTTP Code: 304 (Not Modified)
Bandwidth used (bytes): 124,620
Hits: 620

HTTP Code: 404 (Not Found)
Bandwidth used (bytes): 285,185
Hits: 657

HTTP Code: 403 (Forbidden)
Bandwidth used (bytes): 2,908
Hits: 7

HTTP Code: 408 (Request Timeout)
Bandwidth used (bytes): 0
Hits: 11,205

Total bandwidth usage (bytes): 1,457,619,049,720 (1.457 TB)
Total hits: 10,129,137

The above figures do not match s7r's total due to the first set of log
files not being in the downloads, but it isn't a huge difference and
is in proportion to the previous results.

T




On 13/07/2015 23:54, s7r wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> Here are the latest counts for the OnionBalace hidden service 
> http://eujuuws2nacz4xw4.onion/ :
> 
> Failback instance #1: 2329348 Failback instance #2: 1822384 
> Failback instance #3: 2025677 Failback instance #4: 2109677 
> Failback instance #5: 2202052 ================================ 
> *TOTAL: 10489138*
> 
> Uptime is ~2 weeks. We have passed the 10 million threshold, not
> bad, especially for a ~2 week period of time. Logs are here: 
> https://www.sky-ip.org/onionbalance/
> 
> Each failback instance had 2 introduction points in the master 
> descriptor.
> 
> Thanks to everyone who contributed in this! Please stop the
> automated scripts which connect to this hidden service now. I am
> temporarily shutting it down for 1 or 2 days, in order to install a
> script which will collect rendezvous circuit statistics on each
> failback instance. We need this info since we can't say how many
> clients or circuits made the 10 million successful hits from
> above.
> 
> In the next part of the test we will make sure we use a separate 
> rendezvous circuit for each request, using a modified third party 
> script with -tor-auto-isolate. This is extremely high load on the 
> network and it's VERY RUDE to do it in the wild with Guards (also 
> responsible for other users traffic). For this reason, I have
> asked TheCthulhu for a high end server where I've setup a
> non-public bridge to be used for this. This way, at least we won't
> be hammering on Guards. I want to run it for shorter period of time
> (max. 72 hours), but at 'full speed'.
> 
> Who is interested and able to help, please email me directly and
> I'll provide the necessary tools and info.
> 
> Results and logs will be made public immediately after. I want to
> see how many different rendezvous circuits can be created with a
> hidden service (failback instance) if it has only 2 introduction
> points in the master descriptor and how many such circuits will
> each server take. It might be helpful for deciding related to prop
> 224 (next generation hidden services) - merging HSDirs and IPs -
> how many of them should a hidden service have by default.
> 
> 
> On 7/8/2015 5:07 PM, Thomas White wrote:
>> Just to expand on s7r's number, I just pulled the latest logs
>> from the servers and compiled a quick breakdown of the HTTP
>> codes, bandwidth etc for anyone interested:
> 
>> HTTP Code: 200 (OK) Bandwidth used (bytes): 690,400,220,422
>> Hits: 4,784,288
> 
> 
>> HTTP Code: 206 (Partial Content) Bandwidth used (bytes):
>> 5,202,918 Hits: 64
> 
> 
>> HTTP Code: 304 (Not Modified) Bandwidth used (bytes): 52,059
>> Hits: 259
> 
> 
>> HTTP Code: 404 (Not Found) Bandwidth used (bytes): 266,053 Hits: 
>> 611
> 
> 
>> HTTP Code: 403 (Forbidden) Bandwidth used (bytes): 2,908 Hits: 7
> 
> 
>> HTTP Code: 408 (Request Timeout) Bandwidth used (bytes): 0 Hits: 
>> 5,442
> 
> 
>> Total bandwidth usage (bytes): 690,405,744,360 (690 GB)
> 
>> Total hits: 4,790,671
> 
> 
>> Not bad for a few days work guys!
> 
>> T
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> On 08/07/2015 03:00, s7r wrote:
>>> *Numbers look good: Over 4 million hits in 7 days.*
> 
>>> I want again to use this opportunity to say THANK YOU to 
>>> everyone who is contributing and stress testing. 4 million 
>>> requests tell me people are putting quite some effort into it. 
>>> Please continue to stress test as much as you can in the next 
>>> days. After I collect some rendezvous circuit stats also, we
>>> will stop the test - don't want to overkill the network, prefer
>>> to leave more bandwidth capacity for users.
> 
>>> I was waiting to have some rendezvous circuit statistics as 
>>> well, to compare them with the hits on the webserver and have
>>> an overview on the circuits stats and average number of
>>> requests per circuit. Hopefully this will happen in the next
>>> days. Since you asked, here are the exact numbers now.
> 
>>> The service was started 1st July 2015. Here are the counts 
>>> today, 8th July (little over 7 days of uptime):
> 
>>> Failback instance #1: 956281 Failback instance #2: 732187 
>>> Failback instance #3: 837818 Failback instance #4: 768636 
>>> Failback instance #5: 911546 =============================
>>> TOTAL: 4206468
> 
>>> There are no significant warnings or errors - the same
>>> instances are running since service first started, no reboot
>>> or application restart. I am happy with how it works. As you
>>> can see we have *over 4 million hits*. The number of requests
>>> per failback instance confirms the load is fairly spread.
> 
>>> Hidden service http://eujuuws2nacz4xw4.onion/ up and strong!
> 
>>> On 7/8/2015 1:48 AM, tqr2813d376cjozqap1l@tutanota.com wrote:
>>>> 4. Jul 2015 22:57 by s7r@sky-ip.org <mailto:s7r@sky-ip.org>:
> 
>>>> After little over 3 days of uptime, the OnionBalance hidden 
>>>> service http://eujuuws2nacz4xw4.onion 
>>>> <http://eujuuws2nacz4xw4.onion/> was successfully accessed
>>>> over 1 Million times. There was no complaint in any of the
>>>> running Tor instance s.
> 
> 
> 
>>>> Hey s7r, things still looking OK? How are the numbers now?
> 
> 
> 
> 
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