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Re: [tor-talk] using same usernames on same websites under tor and privacy -



On 15 August 2016 at 11:29, shirish शिरीष <shirishag75@gmail.com> wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> Most sites more or less use https:// by default nowadays. However, it
> has been suggested by quite a few people that you do not use the same
> usernames when using tor.
>
> While for new sites it certainly makes sense, for sites which you have
> been using (like mail) and say forums or wherever reputation is
> important, it makes sense to use the same identity.  Also in some
> sites it is illegal to have more than one username from the same mail
> address. So you have to make a new identity altogether which is
> painstaking and takes time.
>
> Could somebody comment as it relates to both privacy and identity at
> the same time.

Interesting discussion, I'll look forward to hearing peoples' views.

Allowing correlation between multiple sites based on the same identity
likely will reduce privacy, I assume, though the extent of that impact
might be debatable. It'd make the risk assessment and the opsec more
complicated and more error-prone respectively, but assuming you can
overcome that, the impact might be negligible. I'm curious to know how
you'd assess the risk, under those circumstances.

Personally I don't see much overlap between communities, so I tend to
use different pseudonyms on different sites and forums, but there's
also very little risk to me if they were to be associated.  But I can
well imagine the opposite - if I had an established identity and
reputation like the Grugq or Moxie or something, then I'd want to
achieve, if not conformity, then at least known association between
identities on multiple forums within the same community. And I'd
definitely want to avoid impacting my privacy and anonymity. I would
guess that achieving that might just be a question of abstracting the
comms a bit. Use the same identity, but give it a separate email
address and Tor connection, for example - that's a lot easier to
manage now that we have separate circuits per browser tab, I imagine.

Interesting topic, thanks!

-J
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