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Re: [Cryptography] reliable broadcast channel



On 11/8/20, Sid Spry <sid AT aeam.us> wrote:
>> On Thu, Nov 05, 2020 at 09:05:21AM +1000, jamesd AT echeque.com wrote:
>> > But interesting protocols are likely to involve small groups in which
>> > we
>> > want the transaction to fail if more than half the participants are
>> > defecting.
>
> I can see warning a user if there is an irregularity in the way Monero
> tends to do, but what actionable information does this give the user?
> The situation has become degenerate, you may just need to stop
> doing whatever it was you were doing.

Isn't it important to track and act on these things?  With tor,
gnunet, blockchains, sneakernet, there are a lot of ways to reach out
to the world and at least store an error report with the network
developers.

If network disruption happens a lot, the users, developers, and
designers will make the network environment more robust.  For example,
by providing a way to interact with others with the same issue, on an
error report page.

> The example of check kiting is a bad one -- the solution is probably
> to view the "unauthorized credit" (double spend) as either
> inconsequential or impossible.
>
> The two general's is insoluble. If your communication link is faulty then
> you will not be able to provably reach consensus.

Isn't it well known that nakomoto solved, effectively enough for
common use, the two general's problem?  I googled this.
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