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Re: [Cryptography] Mutually authenticated TLS

On Fri, Mar 09, 2018 at 03:29:03PM -0800, Bill Frantz wrote:
> On 3/8/18 at 3:25 PM, nico AT cryptonector.com (Nico Williams) wrote:
> >Speaking of fresh certs, I think we should just converge on fresh certs
> >and to hell with OCSP and CRLs.  This necessitates an online CA to
> >re-issue certs often, but so what.
> This was our conclusion when we did the Simple Public Key Infrastructure
> (SPKI) work in the IETF. SPKI certs can't be revoked. They have to time out.

I mean, I like the idea of OCSP stapling, but fresh certs works without
having to change anything other than provisioning.  For servers that's a
fairly simple thing.  No, wait, it's not -- *nothing* is ever simple for
PKI applications, is it.  Way too many TLS implementations require
either restarting services to update certs or writing special
application code to support switching to new certs.  But still, that's
only boiling a lake, while adding OCSP stapling everywhere is more like
boiling an ocean.

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