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Re: [Cryptography] Crypto basic income

> https://medium.com/@guilhermepcampos/universal-crypto-basic-income-460fc46207f6
> http://github.com/the-laughing-monkey/cicada-platform
> https://blockchainhub.net/blockchain-oracles/

Cryptocurrency UBI effect already happens to holders during
adoption phase, "it keeps going up" vs others on forex, but
thereafter upon steady state it appears
- they have to invest it to earn as with any fiat into stock / bond / biz
- mechanical coin deflation could also effect an apparent UBI of
purchase power up relative to other forex coins

And since "growth" is a bit critically closed loop concerning Earth,
one needs to think about time horizon in which present day
UBI thinking would remain valid vs asymptotic average circular

> Do you think it will be possible, at some point, to have some sort of biometric public key infrastructure, where public and private keys are directly pegged to a persons biometric details?

DNA has enough bits to create a unique / dependant key,
DNA authentication is still slow, reprogramming is possible
but as yet undeveloped nonproduction tech.

> Could biometrics completely replace the need for passwords?

Passwords are supposed to be held in secret mind, and rubberhose
is supposed to be forbidden crime. Biometrics are dusted along
your path to the point of easy failure.

> If compromise of biometric details occurs, how would one go around to solve this, since it's not possible to, for example, create a new fingerprint for a person?

See in mind above. If you want more bits there, then you have
to legally expand to allow extension of mind into devices, whether
carried droids, injected hw sec modules, or neural implant arduinos.

> users might well be effectively forced to provide
> DNA samples in various places.  (E.g., if a government were to require
> a DNA sample before issuing a driver's license or passport.)  This in
> itself might be ok *if* one were to trust an elected government -- and
> all future governments -- not to misuse or mission-creep-use the sample
> for unrelated things.
> But once that database exists, history shows that mission creep is very
> likely, including nonconsentual or forced-"consentual" commercial uses.
> The classic example is an insurance company buying (enough of a government
> to allow) access to the database and then using it to deny life insurance
> coverage to anyone with a high-risk-of-disease DNA profile.  (This is
> already an issue with medical records, where it's essentially impossible
> to buy individual life insurance in the US or Canada without "consenting"
> to the Medical Information Bureau
>   https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIB_Group
> searching one's medical records.)

> Who out there can't wait until AFIS gets pwn'd?

Keeping in mind such entities are extremely likely to be
keeping civilian background biometrics forever too.

Beware what you create.