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Re: [FD] Anhui Huami Mi Fit Android Application - Unencrypted Update Check



What's the issue here exactly? An attacker can just prevent an the in app
update check from realizing it needs to nag the user?

The actual update logic and update-ability is controlled through the Play
Store, no?

-Tim Strazzere


On Tue, Nov 26, 2019 at 10:27 AM David Coomber <
davidcoomber.infosec AT gmail.com> wrote:

> Anhui Huami Mi Fit Android Application - Unencrypted Update Check
> --
> https://www.info-sec.ca/advisories/Huami-Mi-Fit.html
>
> Overview
>
> "Mi Fit tracks your activity, analyzes sleep, and evaluates your workouts."
>
> (https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.xiaomi.hm.health)
>
> Issue
>
> The Anhui Huami Mi Fit Android application (version 4.0.10 and below),
> does not encrypt the connection when it checks for an update.
>
> Impact
>
> An attacker who can monitor network traffic may be able to tamper with
> the application's update function.
>
> Timeline
>
> October 21, 2019 - Attempted to obtain a security contact via an email
> to support AT amazfit.com
> October 22, 2019 - Provided the details to CERT/CC
> October 23, 2019 - CERT/CC opened a case for tracking
> November 4, 2019 - Attempted to obtain a security contact via an email
> to security AT xiaomi.com
>
> Solution
>
> Upgrade to version 4.0.11 or later
>
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>

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